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Abstract
In this paper, we generalize the notion of Pareto-e±ciency to make
it applicable to environments with endogenous populations. Two ef-
¯ciency concepts are proposed, P-e±ciency and A-e±ciency. The
two concepts di®er in how they treat potential agents that are not
born. We show that these concepts are closely related to the notion of
Pareto-e±ciency when fertility is exogenous. We then prove versions
of the ¯rst welfare theorem assuming that decision making is e±cient
within the dynasty. We discuss two sets of su±cient conditions for
noncooperative equilibria of family decision problems to be e±cient.
These include the Barro and Becker model as a special case. Finally,
we study examples of equilibrium settings in which fertility decisions
are not e±cient, and classify them into ones where ine±ciencies arise
inside the family and ones where they arise across families.
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11 Introduction
Interest in the determinants of the equilibrium path for population has in-
creased recently. (See Becker and Barro (1988), Barro and Becker (1989),
Raut (1990), Doepke (2001), Fernandez-Villaverde (2001), Boldrin and Jones
(2002), and Tertilt (2004). See Nerlove and Raut (1997) for a survey.) Sur-
prisingly, little of this literature has used the tools of modern welfare eco-
nomics (for example, Debreu (1962)) to address the normative questions that
arise. This is because, at least in part, the usual notion of Pareto-e±ciency
is not well de¯ned for environments in which the population is endogenous.
To illustrate this, consider the following example. Compare an allocation
with two agents, each consuming one unit of a lone consumption good, with
an allocation where only one agent is born, but consumes two units of the
consumption good. Is one allocation Pareto-superior to the other? Pareto-
e±ciency would involve a comparison, for each person, of the two alloca-
tions. But since di®erent sets of people are alive in the two allocations, such
a person-by-person comparison seems impossible.
In this paper, we generalize the notion of Pareto-e±ciency to make it
applicable to environments with endogenous populations. We propose two
new e±ciency concepts: P-e±ciency and A-e±ciency. These di®er in the way
that potential agents that are not born are treated. In the ¯rst, P-e±ciency,
unborn children are treated symmetrically with the born agents (i.e., they
have utility functions etc.), but with a limited choice set.1 In the second, A-
e±ciency, e±ciency is de¯ned only through comparisons among agents that
are born (and hence it is not necessary that the unborn have well de¯ned
utility functions). We show that these two concepts are closely related to the
1Throughout, we do not take a stand on how to evaluate the utility of the unborn. Such
a task is well beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, we propose two alternative de¯nitions
of Pareto-optimality which are at opposite extremes of the spectrum of treatments of the
unborn. For either notion, a version of the ¯rst welfare theorem holds.
2notion of Pareto-e±ciency when fertility is exogenous. We then discuss how
these concepts are related to each other. We also give results regarding the
existence of e±cient allocations and derive planning problems that partially
characterize the set of e±cient allocations. We prove a version of the ¯rst
welfare theorem for each of them.
To do this, we provide a fairly general, general equilibrium formulation
of fertility choice. Naturally, such a formulation will be embedded in an
overlapping generations framework. Each decision maker has a ¯xed set of
potential children and decides how many of them will be born. Models of
fertility also naturally involve external e®ects across agents in the economy.
We allow for any individual's utility to depend on the consumption of other
family or dynasty members. This includes the Barro and Becker (1989)
formulation of fertility along with many others. In addition to this utility
externality, there is another more subtle one. From the point of view of the
potential children, this is a model in which their choice set is dependent on
the actions of other agents in the economy. If the parent chooses that they
will not be born, they have e®ectively no choices.
As is usual in models with external e®ects, there is no presumption that
individual behavior will aggregate to an e±cient outcome. However, in mod-
els of fertility, it is commonly assumed that mechanisms exist for transfers
inside the family. Following this logic, we divide the e±ciency question into
two pieces: e±cient transfer systems within a dynastic family and e±cient
trade across dynasties. First, we show using standard arguments that if all
trade across dynasties is done at common, parametric prices and there are no
external e®ects across families, equilibrium is e±cient as long as the dynasty
problem is solved e±ciently internally. Second, we give su±cient conditions
for a noncooperative implementation of the dynastic game to be e±cient.
We discuss two extreme cases that guarantee e±ciency of the family game.
In the ¯rst case, dynasties are perfectly altruistic, which eliminates the po-
tential time consistency problem among family members and thereby assures
3e±ciency. This includes the Barro-Becker model as a special case. In the
second case, if contracts between parents and children are rich enough, so
that parents can e®ectively dictate their children's actions, then e±ciency
is also guaranteed, irrespective of the preference details. Other games and
preference speci¯cations may lead to equilibrium ine±ciencies.
Our approach allows us to easily distinguish between two potential rea-
sons for concern about overpopulation that have been at the center of the
more recent debates on population. The ¯rst of these is the existence of scarce
factors and the `crowding' of these factors that results when the population
is `large.' The second is the potential increase in pollution (e.g., emission
of greenhouse gases) as population grows. We show that scarce factors do
not, in and of themselves, give rise to ine±ciencies in population. Rather,
this externality is `pecuniary' with e®ects manifested in price changes.2 In
contrast, if true external e®ects exist that are related to population size, not
surprisingly, individual choices do not necessarily lead to e±cient population
sizes. This is true both when the external e®ects are negative, like pollution,
and when they are positive, e.g. knowledge spillovers (Romer 1987) or hu-
man capital externalities (Lucas 1988).3 Of course, part of the debate about
overpopulation is a question of distribution of resources, i.e. which of many
e±cient allocations is the best one. While our concepts have nothing to say
about optimal redistribution among agents, we believe that identifying in-
e±ciencies is an important ¯rst step towards such an even more ambitious
goal.
The problem that Pareto e±ciency is not well-de¯ned in the endogenous
population context has been long recognized in the literature. The debate
over alternative concepts dates back to at least Mill (1965) and Bentham
2This is similar to the arguments made in Willis (1987) and Lee and Miller (1990).
3Interestingly, Keynes was one of the ¯rst authors to argue that population growth was
too low in England in the 1920s and that this was a cause for a reduction in inventive
activity and hence stagnation. (See Zimmermann 1989)
4(1948) who propose per-capita utility and the sum of utilities, respectively,
as alternative welfare concepts.4 Early papers employ these alternative so-
cial welfare functions in the context of models where children do not a®ect
preferences and parents do not choose fertility (e.g. Samuelson 1975 and
Dasgupta 1969). The more recent literature assumes that a parent's utility
depends on consumption, utility, and/or number of children, and uses the
Millian and Benthamite criterion to compare population sizes in equilibrium
with the optimal one (Nerlove, Razin, and Sadka (1987, 1989) and Razin
and Sadka (1995)). Eckstein and Wolpin (1985) maximize utility of a rep-
resentative agent instead. Such criteria, however, typically give one optimal
allocation and are very di®erent in spirit from an e±ciency concept that
usually contains a large number of allocations.
A small recent literature addresses the question of optimal populations
using a Paretian approach. Schweizer (1996) and Conde-Ruiz et al. (2004)
are most closely related to our approach. Each paper proposes a new e±-
ciency concept and proves versions of the ¯rst and second welfare theorems.
However, these papers propose concepts that are su±ciently less general than
ours, de¯ned only for symmetric environments and they focus exclusively on
allocations that are identical for all people within a generation. Michel and
Wigniolle (2003) use a concept that compares utilities generation by genera-
tion. Within the context of a speci¯c model they give an example that shows
that the concept of Golden Rule should be modi¯ed in the context of endoge-
nous populations. Willis (1987) also attempts to analyze whether general
equilibrium models with endogenous fertility lead to Pareto-e±cient alloca-
tions. Willis does this, however, without formally de¯ning Pareto-e±ciency
for these environments. Instead, Willis studies the solution to a planning
problem and shows under what conditions it coincides with a competitive
equilibrium.
An alternative approach is that from the Social Choice Literature. There,
4See Zimmermann (1989) for an excellent summary of the historic debate.
5authors use an axiomatic approach to derive representation theorems for so-
cial orderings which include population size as one of the choices (see for
example Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson (1995), Broome (2003, 2004)).5
These representation theorems have a particularly simple and intuitive form
known as critical level utilitarianism { a new person should always be added
to the population as long as the value to society of doing this exceeds some
critical level. As with the Millian and Benthamite criterion, the goal of this
literature is to determine one optimal population size. Our approach is dif-
ferent and complementary in that it gives de¯nitions that are analogous to
the usual Pareto Frontier. As is typically the case even without the issues
of endogenous fertility, this gives a large set of e±cient outcomes while the
social choice approach typically gives only one (for each critical level). On
the plus side, our approach requires only ordinal comparisons and hence,
no judgements about the meaning of interpersonal comparisons of utility, or
issues about 'scaling' of utility functions is necessary. In addition, our ap-
proach naturally lends itself to addressing questions concerning the e±ciency
of privately chosen fertility levels without adding in the extra issues inherent
to distributional questions.
Finally, a few authors have pointed out various reasons for why the
private and social costs of having children could di®er (Friedman (1972),
Chomitz and Birdsall (1991), Lee and Miller (1991), Simon (1992), and Star-
rett (1993)). These papers informally discuss types of externalities that could
arise in the context of fertility choice, but none provides a formal concept or
the tools to thoroughly address the e±ciency question.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
introduce notation. In Section 3, we give de¯nitions of our two notions of
Pareto-optimality, give some simple examples and discuss some properties
of the concepts. Section 4 contains the development of the analog of the
¯rst welfare theorem for settings in which population is endogenous and
5Section 6 of Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson (2002) provides an excellent survey.
6the decision-making unit is a family. In Section 5, we show that the Barro
and Becker (1989) model of fertility choice is one example of a model in
which our form of dynastic maximization holds and hence, the population
chosen in equilibrium is e±cient. Section 6 is devoted to discussing various
applications of the concepts. In it we show that the theory allows us to make
a tight distinction between two possible sources of ine±ciency { scarcity of
resources and global external e®ects. We show that resource scarcity per
se (e.g., land crowding) does not give rise to ine±cient fertility, while the
presence of global external e®ects does. Finally, we present an example of
what might cause family maximization to fail. Section 7 concludes.
2 Notation and Feasible Allocations
Dasgupta (1995, p. 1899) points out that \developing the welfare economics
of population policies has proved to be extremely di±cult: our ethical in-
tuition at best extends to actual and future people, we do not yet possess
a good moral vocabulary for including potential people in the calculus." In
this section, we aim to make progress on this dimension by providing a new
framework that makes extending the tools of modern welfare economics to
questions of optimal populations possible. An important component of our
framework is an explicit dynastic structure, something that has been largely
ignored in the literature. The advantage of an explicit dynastic structure is
threefold. First, it allows for external e®ects (e.g. altruism) between family
members. It follows that even if the planner puts zero weight on a person, it
might still be optimal for that person to be born, because a parent wants the
child. That is, in our framework we take people's preferences about other
people explicitly into account. Second, we make it explicit that creating an-
other person is costly, and that this cost might not always be transferable
(e.g. the time cost of a mother nursing a baby). Thirdly, it introduces a nat-
ural asymmetry between people who are alive for sure (the initial generation)
7and those that might or might not be born (everyone else).
Consider an overlapping generations economy, where each generation
makes decisions about fertility. For simplicity, each agent is assumed to
live only for one period. The initial population in period 0 is denoted by
P0 = f1;:::;Ng. Each person can give birth to a maximum of ¹ f children.6
For each period t, the potential population, Pt, is de¯ned recursively as
Pt ´ Pt¡1 £ F; where F = f1;:::; ¹ fg, and we denote by P the population of
all agents potentially alive at all dates. Simply put, P is the set of all indi-
viduals that might be, depending on fertility choices, nodes of one of the N
family trees, one for each time 0 agent. Then, an individual born in period t
is indexed by it 2 Pt and can be written as it = (it¡1;it), specifying that it is
the itth child of the parent it¡1. For example, it = (1;3;2) means that person
it is the second child of the third child of person 1 2 P0. We often simply
write i because the length of the vector already indicates the period in which
the agent was born. Similarly, a fertility plan, denoted by f, is a description
of the number of children born to each agent. Thus, 0 · f(i) · ¹ f for all
i 2 P. Each fertility plan f implicitly de¯nes the subset (of P) of individuals
actually born under the plan f. This set will be denoted by I(f) and is
de¯ned recursively by ¯rst, i0 2 I(f) for i0 2 P0; for i0 2 P0, (i0;i1) 2 I(f)
if and only if i1 · f(i0), etc. Let It(f) = I(f) \ Pt denote the set of people
alive in period t under the fertility plan f. I(f) is the set of N actual family
trees realized under the fertility plan f, one for each time 0 agent, or dynasty
head. For i0 2 P0, let Di0 be the set of potential descendants of i0 including
i0 himself. That is i = (^ {;i1;:::;it) 2 Di0 , ^ { = i0. Note that Di\Di0 = ; if
i 6= i0: We will call Di 'dynasty i.' Then, we can write f = (fi0)i02P0 when it
6Throughout most of the paper, we will assume that the number of children possible is
discrete. Many of the models of fertility choice (e.g., Barro and Becker (1989)) allow for
non-integer choices. Much of the the analysis presented here can be done in this framework
as well (see Golosov et al (2006)). Finally, note that we assume that individuals have
children, not couples. This is done to simplify the development that follows.
8is necessary to distinguish between the fertility plans for di®erent dynasties.
For any fertility plan f, we will use the notation I(fi), i 2 P0, to denote i and
all of i0s descendants under the plan { I(fi) = I(f)\Di. Note that I(fi) does
not depend on the f¡i, but only on fi: We denote the set of all fertility plans
by F.7 Figure 1 illustrates the notation graphically in a 2-period setting.
We assume that there are k goods available in each period. Goods will be
interpreted in a broad sense here { included are labor, leisure, capital services,
etc. Given any fertility plan, a consumption plan, x, is a determination of the
level of consumption of these k goods for each person that is actually born.
That is, x : I(f) ! Rk, where x(i) 2 Rk, represents the consumption of agent
i 2 I(f). There is one representative ¯rm, which behaves competitively. The
technology is characterized by a production set, Y ½ Rk1, that describes
all feasible input-output combinations. An element of the production set is
denoted by y 2 Y . We will write y = fytg1
t=0, where yt = (y1
t;:::;yk
t ) is the
projection of the production plan onto time t.
An allocation is then given by a fertility plan, a consumption plan and
a production plan { (f;x;y): We will denote by A the set of all alloca-
tions, and, for i 2 P, we will use A(i) to denote the set of all allocations
in which i is born. When it is important to distinguish the choices individ-
ual i makes from those made by the other agents, we will use the notation
(f(i);x(i);f(¡i);x(¡i)).
We assume that each potential agent is described by both an endowment
of goods and preferences. We will use e(i) 2 Rk to denote individual i's
endowment and note that e(i) will be irrelevant in all that follows if i = 2 I(f).
To simplify, we assume that preferences are described by a utility function,
denoted by ui(f;x), which we allow to depend on the entire fertility and
consumption plan components of the allocation. We do this to allow for the
7Formally, f : P !f0;1;:::; ¹ fg. We only consider 'feasible' fertility plans { those for
which f(it) = 0 =) f(it;i) = 0 for all i 2 F. F is then the set of these feasible fertility
plans.
9possibility of external e®ects across members of a family. For example, this
speci¯cation allows utility to depend on fertility choices and the consumption
of one's children etc. Below we will add an assumption restricting utility to
depend only on fertility and allocations within one's own dynasty.
We consider two possible assumptions for the domain of ui:
Assumption 1 P for each i 2 P, there is a well de¯ned, real-valued utility
function ui : A ! R.
Assumption 2 A for each i 2 P, there is a well de¯ned, real-valued utility
function ui : A(i) ! R.
The di®erence between these two assumptions is that in the ¯rst, we
assume that utility is well de¯ned for all potential agents, even for plans in
which they are not born. In the second, we assume that utility is only de¯ned
for an individual over those allocations in which he is born. We will use these
di®erent notions in our de¯nitions of e±ciency that follow below.
There is a long-standing debate in the moral philosophy literature on
what the utility of unborn people should be (see for example Singer (1993)).
When considering preferences about adding new people to the status quo,
there are three ways of thinking about this: (i) What are the preferences of
the parents, siblings, and anyone else who feels potentially altruistic towards
the newborn? (ii) How does the newly added person feel about this? (iii)
What are the preferences of \society as a whole." Parental preferences (i)
is probably the least controversial concept and most models of endogenous
fertility include some sort of altruistic preferences like this { either from
parents to children, from children to parents, or both. This implies that there
is a trade-o® between having a child and not. Such preferences can also easily
be derived from observed choices.8 Other approaches to e±cient fertility
choice (like the social welfare approach of Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson
8See Dasgupta (1994) for an ethical discussion of how parents should value fertility.
10(1995)) make explicit assumptions about societal preferences (i.e., iii) while
we do not.9 Finally, do people have preferences about being born or not? And
if so, what are these preferences? These are hard questions. Although we will
sometimes assume that these preferences are well de¯ned (i.e., Assumption 1
holds), we will only use this assumption for one of our concepts of e±ciency.
For the second, which we call A-e±ciency below, we will only use assumption
2. Thus, in A-e±ciency, the value of an additional child is based exclusively
on the extra utility brought about to parents, grandparents, siblings, etc.
Our second concept, P-e±ciency, does require well-de¯ned preferences that
include the state in which an individual is not born. However, the results
that we will prove (equilibrium fertility choice is P-e±cient) do not require
assumptions on the form of these preferences { only that they exist.
Each individual that is born has a set of fertility and consumption plans
that is feasible for them. For simplicity, we will assume that this is the same
for everyone and will denote it by Z ½ f0;1::; ¹ fg£Rk. The simplest version
of this would have Z = f0;1::; ¹ fg£Rk
+ so that any choice of fertility level and
any non-negative consumption is allowed. Since some models of fertility put
restrictions on the joint choices of consumption and fertility (e.g., parents
must care for their own children), we allow for the extra generality in Z.
Most models of fertility also have a transferable cost of child production. Let
c(n) 2 Rk
+ be the goods cost of having n children. We assume that this is
the same for everyone for simplicity.
Assumption 3 c(0) = 0; and c(n) is strictly increasing in n.
We can now de¯ne feasibility for this environment.
De¯nition 1 An allocation (f;x;y) is feasible if
1. (f(i);x(i)) 2 Z; for all i 2 I(f);










e(i) + yt for all t,
3. y 2 Y:
3 E±cient Allocations
The formulation above turns models with an endogenous set of agents into
one with a ¯xed set of potential agents, but with external e®ects in pref-
erences, restrictions on what those potential agents that are not born can
choose and, possibly, domain restrictions on their utility functions. An ad-
vantage of this construction is that we can use, as a ¯rst cut, the normal
notion of Pareto-e±ciency if utility functions are de¯ned everywhere (i.e., if
Assumption 1 is satis¯ed). We call this concept P-e±ciency, where P refers
to populations. This concept treats born and unborn people symmetrically
and preserves the principle of `inclusiveness' of the usual Pareto criterion
when comparing two allocations { every potential agent is `consulted' and
one allocation dominates if and only if it is at least as good for all agents.
If utility functions are not de¯ned for unborn agents over allocations in
which they are not born (i.e., only Assumption 2 is satis¯ed) it is not possible
to adopt such a strong notion of inclusiveness in the Pareto criterion. Indeed,
if one goes to the opposite extreme and assumes that it is not possible to
assign utilities to the unborn agents for any allocation in which they are not
born, it is only possible, when comparing two allocations, to compare the
utilities of agents that are alive in both. Our second notion of e±ciency
uses this reasoning exactly { when comparing two allocations, (f;x;y) and
(f0;x0;y0) we compare the utilities of all agents that are alive in both, I(f)\
I(f0). We call this second version A-e±ciency, since it focuses on alive agents.
It is important to note that this does not mean that the consumption, etc., of
a potential child is not considered, rather that these enter only through the
utility of other, alive, agents through familial external e®ects (e.g., parental
12altruism, etc.)
As we will see later, many of our results hold for both de¯nitions of
e±ciency, but we will also see that in speci¯c applications the choice of
concept matters.
3.1 Basic Concepts
P-e±ciency does not distinguish between agents who are born and not born
in its treatment beyond what is implicit in feasibility and preferences. It is
de¯ned as follows.
De¯nition 2 A feasible allocation (f;x;y) is P-e±cient if there is no other
feasible allocation ( ^ f; ^ x; ^ y) such that
1. ui( ^ f; ^ x) ¸ ui(f;x) for all i 2 P,
2. ui( ^ f; ^ x) > ui(f;x) for at least one i 2 P.
Let P denote the set of all P-e±cient allocations. If for any allocation
(f;x;y) there exists some feasible allocation ( ^ f; ^ x; ^ y) such that (1) and (2)
in the de¯nition above are satis¯ed, then we say that ( ^ f; ^ x; ^ y) P-dominates
(f;x;y). It follows that under Assumption 1, P-domination is a well de¯ned
ordering of the feasible set. It is not complete (typically), but it is transi-
tive and irre°exive. These are all properties of the usual notion of Pareto
Optimality in settings with ¯xed populations as well.
This de¯nition seems to be the most natural extension of Pareto e±ciency
in the framework with endogenous fertility. It has, however, two important
de¯ciencies. First, to choose which allocations are e±cient it is necessary
that the preferences of the unborn agents are well de¯ned { Assumption 1
must be satis¯ed. Unlike alive agents, whose preferences could be at least
deduced from their observed choices, preferences of the unborn agents are
13inherently impossible to observe.10 Therefore, the set of e±cient allocations
will depend on an arbitrary choice of the preferences for the unborn. This
leads to a second de¯ciency. One natural benchmark level of utility for
the unborn is that being alive is always preferred. We can formalize this
assumption in the following way:
Assumption 4 a) For all i 2 P, there exists ¹ ui such that for all (f;x), if
i 2 PnI(f), then ui(f;x) = ¹ ui;
b) For all (f;x) and all i, if i 2 I(f), then ui(f;x) > ¹ ui.
Note that if Assumption 4 is satis¯ed with ¹ ui = 0, then P-e±ciency
satis¯es what Dasgupta (1994) calls the Pareto-Plus Principle: An allocation
with an additional person enjoying a positive utility level is preferred to an
allocation without the additional person but otherwise identical.
It is easy to see that under this assumption it is impossible to have a
population level which is too high. Any allocation with fewer agents will
necessarily decrease the utility of the agents who were born under original
allocations, and therefore the new allocation cannot be more e±cient in a
P-sense.
Our second notion of e±ciency overcomes these di±culties by treating
born and unborn potential people asymmetrically. In this way, e±cient al-
locations do not depend on preferences of the unborn, or even whether such
preferences are de¯ned at all { that is, only Assumption 2 needs to be satisi-
¯ed (but it is also de¯ned if Assumption 1 is satis¯ed).
De¯nition 3 A feasible allocation (f;x;y) is A-e±cient if there is no other
feasible allocation ( ^ f; ^ x; ^ y) such that
1. ui( ^ f; ^ x) ¸ ui(f;x) 8i 2 I(f) \ I( ^ f);
10Note, however, that preferences of people that are not yet born can also not be deduced
from observed choices. Yet it is a standard assumption made in overlapping generations
models that utility functions for all (future) generations are well-de¯ned.
142. ui( ^ f; ^ x) > ui(f;x) for some i 2 I(f) \ I( ^ f):
The de¯nitions of the set of A-e±cient allocations, A, and A-dominating
allocations are de¯ned analogously to P-e±ciency.
This de¯nition di®ers from P-e±ciency in that only a subset of the po-
tential population is considered when making utility comparisons across al-
locations. An allocation is superior if no one who is alive in both allocation
is worse o® and at least one person alive under both allocations is strictly
better o®. Since utility comparisons are made only for the agents who are
in fact born, (i.e., i 2 I(f) \ I( ^ f)) it has the added advantage of not re-
quiring utility functions to be de¯ned for agents who are not born. We call
it A-e±ciency because only `alive' agents are considered. (Note that even
agents that are not born count in A-e±ciency, at least indirectly, since they
enter the utility functions of their parents, etc.) It has the disadvantage that
the set of agents considered in welfare comparisons depends on the two al-
locations being considered. This can, in some cases, cause cycles and hence,
non-existence.11 However, we show in Section 3.4 that generically (in utility
functions) the set of A-e±cient allocations is non-empty.12
The notions P and A e±ciency extend the standard notion of Pareto
e±ciency. In particular, given any feasible allocation (f¤;x¤;y¤), we can
consider the standard Pareto ranking over allocations holding ¯xed the pop-
ulation at I(f¤). The next proposition shows that if (f¤;x¤;y¤) is P-e±cient
(resp. A-e±cient) (x¤;y¤) is a Pareto e±cient allocation in the usual sense.
Proposition 1 a) If Assumption 4a holds and if (f¤;x¤;y¤) is P-e±cient,
then, the consumption/production plan (x¤;y¤) is an allocation that is Pareto-
optimal among the agents in I(f¤).
11Note that A-domination need not be transitive.
12Conde-Ruiz et al (2004) propose a modi¯cation of A-e±ciency that requires symmetry
among all people born in the same period. This modi¯ed concept guarantees existence,
but is substantially less general as it does not allow for heterogeneity in preferences,
endowments, or allocations at a point in time.
15b) If (f¤;x¤;y¤) is A-e±cient, the consumption/production plan (x¤;y¤) is
an allocation that is Pareto-optimal among the agents in I(f¤).
Proof. Let (f¤;x¤;y¤) be a P- e±cient (A-e±cient) allocation. Suppose
that there is some allocation (~ x; ~ y) that is feasible given the set of alive
people I(f¤)13 that dominates (x¤;y¤) in the usual Pareto sense. It is imme-
diate that in this case, (f¤; ~ x; ~ y) necessarily A-dominates (f¤;x¤;y¤). That
(f¤; ~ x; ~ y) also P-dominates (f¤;x¤;y¤) follows from Assumption 4a. There-
fore (f¤;x¤;y¤) could not be P-e±cient (A-e±cient).
The converse of this proposition will not necessarily hold even if As-
sumption 4 holds. That is, even if an allocation is Pareto E±cient in the
usual sense holding the population ¯xed, it need not be either P- e±cient
or A-e±cient since welfare might be increased by changing the set of people
alive.14
3.2 Examples
To illustrate our two notions of e±ciency, we now consider two simple exam-
ples motivated by Barro and Becker (1988, 1989).
Example 1: Consider a 2-period example with only one parent, P0 =
f1g. In period 0, there are e0 units of a good that can be used either for
consumption or for raising children. The cost of each child is µ > 0. Parents
care about own consumption and are altruistic towards each child as well.





u(c(1)) + ¯ 1
f(1)´
Pf(1)
j=1 u(c(1;j)); if f(1) > 0
u(c(1)); if f(1) = 0
where u is non-negative, strictly increasing and strictly concave, 0 < ¯ < 1
13Feasibility given a set of people is de¯ned in the usual way.
14Of course if it is physically not feasible to change the set of people, then all three
concepts coincide.





u(c(1;i)) if 1 · i · f(1) (i is born) ;
¹ u if f(1) < i (i is not born).
In the example, we assume that Assumption 1 holds: utility of the child is
well-de¯ned when not born. Note that without this assumption P-e±ciency
is not de¯ned, but, A-e±ciency is unchanged. Further, we assume that each
child, if born, has an endowment of the consumption good e(1;i) = e1 > 0.
To simplify, we assume that e1 is not transferable.15 Then the possible utility
levels for the parent are given by






= u(e0 ¡ µf(1)) + ¯f(1)
1¡´u(e1);
where f(1) 2 f0;1;:::; ¹ fg. We assume that W(f(1)) has a unique maximum,
f¤, with 0 < f¤ < ¹ f. Further, let e0 > µ ¹ f.
First, consider the case where u(e1) > ¹ u. In this case, it is straightforward
that no fertility level less than f¤ is e±cient (both A or P): increasing
fertility to f¤ from such a level strictly increases the utility of the parent
and the added children and does not lower the utility level of anyone. It also
follows that any f 2 ff¤;:::; ¹ fg along with c(1) = e0 ¡ µf gives a P-e±cient
allocation. This is because, any increase in fertility would necessarily lower
the utility of the parent, and any decrease would lower the utility of the
children that are no longer born.
In contrast, f¤ is the unique A-e±cient fertility level because any fertility
level higher than f¤ is A-dominated by f¤: moving to f¤ strictly increases
the utility of the parent and does not change the utility of the children that
are still born.
15We assume that each born period 1 child must consume her own endowment. Adding
the possibility of redistributing the endowments of period 1 children increases the size of
the sets of e±cient outcomes in the usual way.
17If instead u(e1) < ¹ u, the set of P-e±cient allocations correspond to all
fertility levels in the set f0;:::;f¤g, while the unique A-e±cient allocation
still has f = f¤ as above.
In this example, the set of P-e±cient allocations is much larger than the
set of A-e±cient allocations, a di®erence that holds more generally, as we
will discuss below. The example shows that larger populations can be A-
dominated by smaller ones if reducing the size of the population does not
lower the utility of those agents that are still born. Thus, A-e±ciency does
not su®er from the di±culty pointed out above for P-e±ciency.
Example 2: One might get the impression from Example 1 that A-e±ciency
corresponds to maximizing the utility of the dynasty head. This is not true
in general, however. Consider a slightly modi¯ed version of Example 1 in
which goods from period 0 can be stored, with no loss, to period 1 and goods
can be transferred among the period 1 agents. Feasibility here is captured in
the two constraints:
c(1) + f(1)µ +
f(1) X
j=1
c(1;j) · e0 + f(1)e1 and c(1) · e0 ¡ f(1)µ
Again ¯rst consider the unique outcome that is best for the dynasty head:
For simplicity, assume that f¤ = 1 and c¤(1) > 0. Then c¤(1;1) ¸ e1 follows
from feasibility. This allocation is clearly A-e±cient. However, this is not
the only A-e±cient allocation. Lowering consumption of the parent by ± and
increasing the consumption of the child by the same amount will also lead to
an A-e±cient allocation as long as u(c¤(1) ¡ ±) + ¯u(c¤(1;1) + ±) > u(e0).16
The logic is the same as with regular Pareto e±ciency: there are two agents
who disagree about the distribution of resources, and e±ciency has nothing
to say about redistribution, hence, many allocations are e±cient.
So far, one could still suspect that fertility in any A-e±cient allocation
is always equal to the most preferred choice of the dynasty head. However,
16If ± is such that the condition is violated, then the parent strictly prefer zero children
and hence the allocation is not A-e±cient.
18this is not true either. If f¤ > 1, then there are also typically A-e±cient
allocations with f < f¤. To see this, let e0 = 100;e1 = 0;µ = 24;¯ =
1;´ = 0 and u(c) =
p
c. For these parameters, the parent's most preferred
allocation is to have two children and split resources evenly, i.e. c(1) =
c(1;1) = c(1;2) = 100¡48
3 , which gives utility 12.48 to the parent, and is
A-e±cient. Now consider the allocation that maximizes the parent's utility
conditional on having only one child: ^ c(1) = ^ c(1;1) = 100¡24
2 = 38. Clearly,
this allocation is strictly preferred by the child, and worse for the parent,
whose utility under this allocation is only 12.33. To see that this allocation
is also A-e±cient note that it cannot be A-dominated by the allocation with
zero children, as this would give only utility
p
100 = 10 to the parent. It
also cannot be A-dominated by any allocation with two children, as any such
allocation would have to give at least 38 to the ¯rst child, which leaves only
100¡38¡48
2 = 7 each for the parent and the second child, and parental utility
decreases to 11.46.
There are also other types of examples where A-e±ciency di®ers from
dynastic head maximization. These include examples where children prefer
to be in families with a large number of children (so that fertility levels higher
than f¤ are A-e±cient) and examples where parents and children do not have
the same utility functions over the consumption of the child (i.e., there is a
time consistency problem within the dynasty { altruism is imperfect). To
save on space, we don't include any examples of this sort here.
3.3 Comparisons to the Social Choice Literature
An alternative approach to optimal population appears in the Social Choice
Literature (see Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson (1995, 1997, 1999)). The
main contribution of this literature are characterization theorems of the func-
tional form of Societal Welfare Functions (SWF) under a variety of alterna-
19tive speci¯cations of axioms.17 Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson (1995) {
henceforth BBD { deals explicitly with the case of variable populations and
is thus the most relevant for comparison with our approach. In that paper,
they derive conditions under which the SWF is of the \critical level general-





[g(ui(f;x)) ¡ g(®)]:19 (1)
The special case where g(z) = z, is known as critical level utilitarianism
and is the case we will focus on here. Note also that critical level utilitarian-
ism reduces to the Benthamite welfare function when ® = 0. For social pref-
erences of these forms, (f;x) is socially weakly preferred to ( ^ f; ^ x) if and only
if W(f;x;®) ¸ W( ^ f; ^ x;®). Here, BBD describe ® as a \societal preference
parameter," with the interpretation that a new person contributes to social
welfare only if his utility is at least ®. Thus, under this approach, the opti-
mal population (or time series of populations) is that (f;x) that maximizes
W(f;x;®) subject to feasibility. If there are no direct utility connections
between potential people and resources are not transferable, it follows that
the rule for ¯nding the optimal population is to keep adding more people
until it is no longer possible to add a person and give her utility level ®.
One insight from this literature is that if there is no altruism, and if
® · 0, then the \repugnant conclusion" follows: It is always optimal to
have the maximal feasible number of people alive. This has been gener-
ally considered a non-desirable property, and hence an insight of BBD is
that critical-level utilitarianism with ® > 0 avoids the repugnant conclusion.
An immediate conclusion then is that life between neutrality (de¯ned as 0
17Axioms used in this literature that are violated by our approach are continuity, com-
pleteness, and, in the case of A-e±ciency, transitivity.
18We abstract from the possibility of production here to simplify the presentation.
19BBD assume that the maximal number of people is ¯nite, which guarantees that this
sum is well-de¯ned.
20utility) and ® should be prevented. As pointed out by Hammond (1988),
an alternative method for ruling out the repugnant conclusion is to assume
that parents care about the well-being of their children.20 As is also evident
from this representation, the BBD axioms imply that there cannot be social
discounting of utility between lifetimes starting at di®erent calendar dates
although discounting of consumption at di®erent dates by a given individual
is allowed.
Our notions of P and A-e±ciency on the other hand, are designed to
address the question of whether or not equilibria in models with endogenous
fertility are e±cient. Therefore we want a set-up where people are connected
(who is the child of whom?) and where there is some altruism or other bene¯t
from children { without this, the equilibrium would be trivial: no children
are born and the world ends after period 0. It follows that Hammond's
comment applies to our set-up, which means the concerns raised by BBD are
not relevant for us. Similarly, the result of no social discounting applies only
in so far that \society" should not discount future generations. However,
there might of course be discounting through the parent's preferences, even
in the BBD setting. Also, note that BBD require that the allocation where
no one is alive is always possible, whereas we start with an initial generation,
so that P0 ½ I(f) for any feasible f.
Comparison with P and A-e±ciency
It is important to note that Pareto optimality is inherently a very di®erent
concept from social welfare maximization. Typically the set of Pareto optima
is very large and is impicitly agnostic about alternative welfare distributions
across agents. On the other hand, the SWF-maximizer (with some assump-
tions) is unique and does make judgements about alternative distributional
arrangements. Moreover, social welfare functions assume interpersonal com-
parability of utility, and because of this are cardinal, not ordinal, which is
20BBD are fairly explicit that ui(f;x) is not supposed to capture overall preferences,
but only a measure of individual well-being.
21not required for notions of e±ciency.21
The simplest way to compare BBD optimal allocations and those that
are P- or A-e±cient is to examine the three concepts in the context of a
simple example. For this, we use Example 1 outlined above, and assume
that g(z) = z, i.e., we restrict attention to the critical level utilitarianism
case. Recall that in that example, assuming that u(1;j)(e1) > ¹ u; the set of
P-e±cient fertility levels is given by Pf= ff¤;:::; ¹ fg, while Af= ff¤g { recall
that everyone consumes their own endowment in Example 1. Let S(®) be
the set of maximizers of W(f;x;®) for a given ®. Then, comparing the three
concepts gives the following results:
i) S(®) is decreasing in ®;
ii) S(®¤) = Af for ®¤ = u(e1).
iii) For all ® · ®¤, S(®) ½ Pf.
iv) For ® > ®¤, if f 2 S(®), f < f¤ and so S(®)\Pf = S(®)\Af= ;.
Figure 2 gives a graphical summary of these results.
From this example we can see that there is no uniform, obvious relation-
ship between S(®) and either Af or Pf. For low critical utility levels (®),
S(®) > f¤ but is a subset of Pf. For high values of ® the opposite is true,
S(®) < f¤.
Since there are no external e®ects in this example that would suggest
privately chosen fertility (i.e., f = f¤) is too high, it would be di±cult to
rationalize any fertility level below that as being reasonable. Higher values
for f can be rationalized, but only if one is willing to assume that the utility
of being born is higher than that of not { this is what P does e®ectively.
This suggests that A-e±ciency might be useful as a way of o®ering some
guidance in choosing ® in settings like this, viz., choose ® so that S(®) =
ff¤g. In our example, this would be ® = u(e1) = 1=¯(f¤)´u0(e0 ¡ µf¤)µ.
Then, the critical level should be higher the higher µ, the marginal cost, and
21It is straightforward to check that both P and A-e±ciency are invariant to arbitrary,
monotone transformations of utility functions of any subset of the agents.
22lower if the marginal utility loss to the parent due to the extra child is low,
u0(e0 ¡ µf¤).
Extending the example to three periods, it is easy to show that the implied
® would have to di®er across generations. This seems also natural if there is
for example technological progress in an economy, then what is considered an
\existence minimum" in a society typically depends on the average standard
of living, not some absolute amount. BBD, on the other hand, derive the
same critical level ® for everyone. The reason is that BBD consider all people
as potential and ask how many lives should ideally exist.22 Considering all
people as potential motivates an anonymity axiom, which then immediately
implies the same critical level ® for everyone. In our work, on the other
hand, we make a clear distinction between the initial generation and potential
future people.
Note also that while ® is critical for S(®), P depends on ¹ u only in a very
limited sense. As was shown in Section 3.2, for low ¹ u, Pf = ff¤;:::; ¹ fg while
for high ¹ u, Pf = f0;:::;f¤g. Note that it is always true that S(®) ½ Pf if
® = ¹ ui for all i. That is, the optimal population size according to critical level
utilitarianism is always P-e±cient as long as one makes the same choices for
the critical level for an individual, ¹ ui, and the critical level for \society", ®.
In other words, if one had strong ethical preferences that life below a certain
level should be prevented, then this could easily be incorporated into our
P-e±ciency concepts by setting the utility of not being born to this critical
level.
3.4 Properties
In this subsection we brie°y discuss to what extent some standard proper-
ties of Pareto e±ciency carry over into our context. We start with a partial
22Dasgupta (1994) labels this the Genesis Problem and points out important di®erences
with set-ups in which an initial set of people exists.
23characterization of e±cient allocations. We then discuss conditions guaran-
teeing that the set of P-e±cient allocations (resp. A-e±cient) is not empty.
Finally, we analyze the relationship between these two notions of e±ciency.
Since P-e±ciency is not de¯ned unless Assumption 1 holds it should be un-
derstood to be assumed to hold in all the results that follow (similarly, we
assume, without explicitly listing it, that at least Assumption 2 holds when-
ever A-e±ciency is being discussed).
We start with a partial characterization of P-e±cient allocations.
Result 1 Pick any welfare weights, fa(i)gi2P; such that a(i) > 0; 8i 2 P.






subject to feasibility and suppose that
P
i2P a(i)ui(f¤;x¤) < 1. Then (f¤;x¤;y¤)
is P-e±cient.
Proof. By way of contradiction, assume that there exists a feasible (f;x;y)
that P-dominates (f¤;x¤;y¤), where (f¤;x¤;y¤) is a solution to (2). Then
ui(f;x) > ui(f¤;x¤) for at least one i and ui(f;x) ¸ ui(f¤;x¤) for all i 2 P.




i2P a(i)ui(f¤;x¤), a contradic-
tion. ¤
In contrast to the usual characterization results, the weights a(i) are
required to be strictly positive for Result 1. The reason is that strict and
weak Pareto-e±ciency do not necessarily coincide in this context because
preferences are typically not strictly monotone in all goods.23 In other words,
in environments in which weak and strong Pareto-e±ciency coincide, Result
1 holds with weakly positive weights.
23In particular, people typically do not receive utility from consumption in periods in
which they are not alive.
24Result 2 Pick any weights, fa(i)gi2P0; such that a(i) ¸ 0 8i 2 P0. Suppose






subject to feasibility and suppose that
P
i2P0 a(i)ui(f¤;x¤) < 1. Then (f¤;x¤;y¤)
is A-e±cient.
Proof. Let (f¤;x¤;y¤) be a solution to Problem (3) and assume by way
of contradiction that it is A-dominated by (f;x;y). Then there must exist
a j 2 I(f¤) \ I(f) such that uj(f;x) > uj(f¤;x¤) and ui(f;x) ¸ ui(f¤;x¤)
for all i 2 I(f) \ I(f¤), i.e. in particular for all i 2 P0. Note that j cannot





i2P0 a(i)ui(f¤;x¤) but (f;x;y) 6= (f¤;x¤;y¤),
hence (f¤;x¤;y¤) is not unique, a contradiction. ¤
That uniqueness is required in Result 2 is unusual. But, using this in
conjuction with the fact that P0 ½ I(f) for every feasible allocation gives
the result since, any other plan must necessarily make some agent in P0
worse o®. If the solution is not unique, and there are two with di®erent
sets of individuals born, individuals in future dates may not be indi®erent
between the two plans even though those in P0 are, and hence, the argument
given may not hold. It also follows from this result that the set of A-e±cient
allocations is generically nonempty, viz., if the planner's problem given here
does NOT have a unique solution, utility functions can be changed by a small
amount so that a unique solution is guaranteed. Then, for these perturbed
utility functions, the set of A-e±cient allocations is nonempty.
From these two results, and a few technical conditions to guarantee that
solutions to the problems like those given actually have solutions, it follows
that both P and A are non-empty.24
24The formal proof of Result 3 is given in Golosov, Jones and Tertilt (2006).
25Result 3 Assume utility functions are continuous and uniformly bounded
above and below, that Z ½ f0;1;:::; ¹ fg£Rk is closed, that Y ½ Rk1 is closed
in the product topology, and that the set of feasible consumption/production
plans is bounded period by period.
a) Then the set of P-e±cient allocations, P, is nonempty.
b) Generically, the set of A-e±cient allocations, A, is nonempty.25
We turn now to the relationship between the set of A and P e±cient
allocations. Intuitively, one would expect that A µ P { as one need not
(weakly) improve the utility of all agents to `block' an allocation, hence it
it typically easier to ¯nd an A-dominating allocation than a P-dominating
allocation. However, there is a counterbalancing e®ect. Sometimes it may be
more di±cult to A-dominate an allocation because the set of people whose
utility could potentially be strictly improved is smaller. Because of this, there
might exist A-e±cient allocations that are not P -e±cient.
Example 3: Consider a two period, one good example with one parent
and one potential child each of which has an endowment of e > 0 units
of the consumption good in the period they are alive. There is a tech-
nology that allows to transfer goods between the periods with a rate 1.
The cost of having a child is µ > 0. The utility function of the parent is
u1(c(1);f(1);c(1;1)) = u(c(1)) + f(1)u(c(1;1)), and that of the potential
child is u(1;1)(c(1);f(1);c(1;1)) = f(1)u(c(1;1)). If the parameters are such
that 2u(e¡µ=2) = u(e), then the parent is indi®erent between having a child
(with both consuming c(1) = c(1;1) = e ¡ µ=2) and not having one, but
the child's utility is higher if born. Because of this, the allocation in which
the child is born P-dominates the one in which he is not, but it does not
A-dominate it. In this case, having the child is both P- and A-e±cient, while
25Generically here means: if A= ; for some choice of utility functions and endowments,
then there is another choice of utility functions, uniformly within " such that A6= ; with
the same endowments.
26not having the child is A- but not P-e±cient.
Examples like this one arise due to a di®erence between Pareto e±ciency
and weak Pareto e±ciency in this environment. This equivalence can break
down in our context for several reasons: lack of strict monotonicity in all
commodities, fertility choices are indivisible, and external e®ects.26 In cases
where these two notions are the same it follows that A½P. Even if the two
notions are not the same, it is `typically' true that `most' of A is contained
in P.
To formalize this, we need some preliminary developments.
Proposition 2 If Assumption 4 holds, if (f;x;y) 2 AnP, and if the alloca-
tion ( ^ f; ^ x; ^ y) P-dominates (f;x;y), then:
i) I(f) ½ I( ^ f);
ii) ui( ^ f; ^ x) = ui(f;x) for all i 2 I(f) \ I( ^ f);
iii) ui( ^ f; ^ x) > ui(f;x) for some i 2 I( ^ f)nI(f):
Proof. Part (i) follows immediately from Assumption 4, which implies that
any P-dominating allocation always has weakly more people. Since (f;x;y) 2
A, it follows that ui( ^ f; ^ x) · ui(f;x) for all i 2 I(f)\I( ^ f). But since ( ^ f; ^ x; ^ y)
P-dominates (f;x;y), it must also be true that ui( ^ f; ^ x) ¸ ui(f;x) for all
i 2 P. Together this implies Part (ii). Then Part (iii) follows from (ii)
together with the fact that ( ^ f; ^ x; ^ y) P-dominates (f;x;y). ¤
The proposition shows that the set of alive people in every P-dominating
allocation is strictly larger, and that those alive in both are strictly indi®er-
ent. If there was a way to increase the population AND increase the utility
of even one of the agents in the original allocation, the allocation in question
could not be A-e±cient. We will use these facts heavily in the discussion
26In particular, when Assumption 4 is satis¯ed, then preferences of unborn are locally
satiated and hence, typically, weak and strong e±ciency need not coincide. Thus, for these
two to coincide, we would need, at a minimum, that utilities of the unborn depend on the
consumption of their born relatives, even if only by a marginal amount.
27that follows. Indeed, the requirement that all agents be exactly indi®erent is
what makes it `rare' for an allocation to be in AnP, as we shall see.
For the remainder of this section, we assume that T is ¯nite and that
there is only one good. We also assume that goods are perfectly transferable
across time (both forward and backward) and that this is the only form
of production that is possible.27 Given this we can replace the production
set, etc., with the following simple assumption on the aggregate feasibility
constraint:
Assumption 5 . Assume that aggregate feasibility take the form
X
i2I(f)




Finally, we specialize the form of the utility functions:








i02I(fj) uii0(x(i0)) if i 2 I(f)
¹ ui if i = 2 I(f);
where uii0 is assumed to be strictly increasing, strictly concave and C1, and
vi is strictly increasing in fj.
Note that we are not assuming that uii0 = ui0i0, and hence, this formula-
tion is quite general. Further note that, by construction, there are assumed
to be no utility externalities across dynasties (this is an assumption we will
make in more generality in the next section).
Now we are ready to state the main result regarding the relationship
between P and A-e±cient allocations:
27The assumption that goods are freely transferable both foward and backward in time
is a strong one. We conjecture that this is not necessary however, because in general,
at e±cient allocations, price-taking agents always act as if goods are freely transferable
across time at the rate of exchange given by the prices that `support' the allocation.
28Proposition 3 Assume that (f¤;x¤) 2 AnP, and that
a) at least one P-dominating allocation of (f¤;x¤), ( ^ f; ^ x), does not strictly
increase the population of every dynasty,
b) x¤(i) > 0 for all i 2 I(f¤),
c) Assumptions 4, 5 and 6 hold.
Then, there exists a sequence f(fn;xn)g; (fn;xn) 2 P s.t. (fn;xn) ! (f¤;x¤):28
Proof: See Appendix A.1.
The proposition shows that under relatively mild assumptions, A-e±cient
allocations are either also P-e±cient, or are arbitrarily close to allocations
that are.
4 Cooperation Within the Family and the First
Welfare Theorem
Our economy has external e®ects both in utility and in consumption sets,
but they are of a very limited type. By construction, the only agents in
the economy who can a®ect i's consumption set are those that are direct
predecessors of i. Moreover, in our description of the consumption sets,
these agents can only a®ect i's choice set through their fertility decisions. In
keeping with this structure, in this section we examine the validity of the ¯rst
welfare theorem under the assumption that within a family (but not across
families) individual agents are cooperative. That is, we formulate a notion
of dynastic maximization that corresponds to a Pareto criterion within the
dynasty.
We show that as long as all external e®ects are con¯ned within the fam-
ily, families view themselves as not a®ecting prices and, within the family,
28We will write (fn;xn) ! (f¤;x¤) if fn = f¤ for large enough n and xn ! x¤ in the
normal Euclidean sense.
29decision making satis¯es this notion of cooperation, then fertility choices are
e±cient. In Section 5, we address the question: Under what conditions do
non-cooperative formulations of the dynastic decision problem lead to coop-
erative dynastic decisions in the sense required here?
Assumption 7 If for two allocations (f;x;y) and (f0;x0;y0), (fj;xj) = (f0
j;x0
j)
for all j 2 Di then uj(z) = uj(z0) for all j 2 Di.
Assumption 8 If j and j0 are in the same dynasty, Di, then uj is monotone
increasing in x(j0). That is, there are no negative external e®ects in consump-
tion within the family.
Thus, there are no external e®ects among agents in di®erent dynasties
and those that do exist within a dynasty are positive.
Next, we de¯ne what it means for an allocation to be optimal for a given
dynasty at a given price sequence. Intuitively, an allocation is dynastically
maximizing if and only if there is no way of increasing the utility of every
member of the dynasty without increasing overall spending by the dynasty.
Before de¯ning a notion of family optimization, we need to specify an
ownership structure for the ¯rm. To simplify, we will assume the ¯rm is
owned only by members of the initial generation. So let Ãi specify the fraction
of the ¯rm that belongs to i, i 2 P0. For a well-de¯ned ownership structure,
we need Ãi ¸ 0, and
P
i2P0 Ãi = 1.
De¯nition 4 Given (p;y), a dynastic allocation for dynasty i, (fi;xi) =
ff(j);x(j)gj2Di is said to be Dynastically P-maximizing if (f(j);x(j)) 2 Z











t ptyt, and if @( ^ fi; ^ xi) = f ^ f(j); ^ x(j)gj2Di such that:
1. ( ^ f(j); ^ x(j)) 2 Z for all j 2 I( ^ fi).
2. uj( ^ fi; ^ xi) ¸ uj(fi;xi) for all j 2 Di.









j2Pt\I( ^ fi) e(j) + Ãi
P
t ptyt.
Dynastic A-maximization is de¯ned similarly.29
For notational simplicity in what follows, we will use ¦i to denote a
dynasty's pro¯ts earned; that is, ¦i = Ãi
P
t ptyt. Note that this depends on
both prices and the production plan of the ¯rm.
An allocation being dynastically maximizing corresponds naturally to the
dynasty using maximizing behavior given the resources it has available to it
overall. Since there is a single dynastic budget set, it is as if the dynasty is
fully free to make any transfers of wealth inside the dynasty that it chooses.
Thus, an allocation being dynastically maximizing implies that no further
transfers (e.g., bequests) within the dynasty can improve dynastic welfare
(in a Pareto sense).
Next we de¯ne the analog of a competitive equilibrium among dynasties.
De¯nition 5 (p¤;f¤;x¤;y¤) is a dynastic P-equilibrium if
1. For all dynasties i, given (p¤;y¤), (f¤
i ;x¤
i) is dynastically P-maximizing.
2. (f¤;x¤;y¤) is feasible.
3. Given p¤, y¤ maximizes pro¯ts, i.e. p¤y · p¤y¤; 8y 2 Y .
A Dynastic A-equilibrium is de¯ned similarly.
Theorem 1 Suppose ui(x(i);f(i);f(¡i);x(¡i)) is strictly monotone in x(i)






t) < 1, and (f¤;x¤;y¤) is P-






t) < 1, and (f¤;x¤;y¤) is A-e±cient.
29It is straightforward to extend these de¯nitions to cover the case of external e®ects
across dynasties.
31Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The proof follows closely the logic of the regular proof of the ¯rst welfare
theorem with two caveats. First, note that the usual ¯rst welfare theorem
may fail in a regular OLG economy due to the double-in¯nity problem. This
is not a problem here, because our equilibrium concept assumes that dynas-
ties are maximizing, not individuals, and that the number of dynasties is
¯nite. Secondly, for the case of A-e±ciency, the set of people that is `eligible'
to count in a potentially superior allocation is endogenous. Relatedly, the
changing set of people could potentially cause problems when summing up
over people. In Appendix A.2 we provide a detailed proof and show that
these caveats do not cause problems here.
Summarizing the results from this section, we see that as long as each
dynasty solves the internal redistribution problem e±ciently, there are no
external e®ects across dynasties, and all dynasties take prices as given, dy-
nastic equilibria are e±cient. In particular, fertility choices, and hence the
sequence of populations that result, are e±cient.
5 Dynastic Games and E±ciency
As is standard in models with external e®ects, equilibrium will naturally in-
volve a mixture of price-taking behavior and quantity-taking behavior { the
agent takes the prices it faces as ¯xed, and takes the actions, in particular
the fertility choices of the other agents as ¯xed, when making its own con-
sumption and fertility choices. Thus, the equilibrium notion is a mixture of
Nash and Walrasian equilibrium.
Exactly what this means depends on the nature of the game being played
by the agents, of course. The most straightforward treatment would be to
formulate a game in which agents' choices are simultaneous moves chosen
at time zero. One would then formulate the game in which the action of
each agent included not only his own consumption and fertility choices, but
32also, possibly, a complex scheme of transfers to the other agents in his own
dynasty. This game would generate a set of equilibrium strategy pro¯les,
each of these generating an equilibrium outcome in terms of consumption and
fertility decisions. Given the development in the sections above, the question
would be, what types of games would generate equilibrium outcomes that
are dynastically e±cient (in either the P or the A sense)?30
Since fertility is intrinsically a dynamic decision, however, this is not the
typical (or the best) way to model these types of decisions. Rather, models
of fertility usually have a dynamic game theoretic formulation in which each
agent who is born in period t must choose levels of both consumption and
fertility in period t + 1 as a function of all previous actions chosen by the
preceding agents in his dynasty. These actions involve both the consumption
and the fertility decisions of predecessors as well as the bequests left, etc.31
In this section we identify su±cient conditions for the equilibrium of the
dynasty game to be e±cient. We ¯nd that the degree of altruism and the
richness of contracts between ancestors and descendants are crucial ingre-
dients. Speci¯cally, we argue that if dynasties are perfectly altruistic or if
parents have perfect control over the actions of their descendants, then family
games will lead to outcomes that are dynastically maximizing. The perfect
altruism case includes the Barro-Becker model as a special case. The al-
truism eliminates the time inconsistency problem between parents and their
30From a formal point of view, this problem is similar to that studied in the clubs
literature: When does a noncooperative formulation give rise to e±cient outcomes? (See
Scotchmer (1997) for an example.) However, the mechanism at work here is quite di®erent.
In club and other local public good environments, e±ciency is guaranteed by competition
between the clubs for members. Here, since the dynasty is the analog of a club, no such
competition between clubs is possible. Rather, here the natural alignment of incentives
within a family guarantees e±ciency within the group.
31Ray (1987) and Streufert (1993) provide an explicit game-theoretic treatment of fam-
ily interaction in the context of exogenous fertility and Raut (1992) in the context of
endogenous fertility model with two-sided altruism.
33descendants. Due to agreement between parents and children, contracts be-
tween parents and children can be fairly limited. We ¯nd that in this case,
allowing for period-by-period bequests to a parents' own children is su±cient
for e±ciency. These bequests may need to be negative in some cases if the
dynasties are su±ciently di®erent.
A second extreme case that works requires no restrictions on preferences,
but requires a rich set of bequest contracts. In particular, it is easy to see
that if the head of the dynasty has a rich set of transfers that allows him to
dictate the behavior of all descendants, then the time inconsistency problem
becomes irrelevant.32 This is a very extreme case, obviously. The point we
want to emphasize here is that some combination of altruism and richness
in bequests is needed to ensure that the equilibrium outcome of the game is
e±cient.
5.1 The Barro-Becker Model
One of the principle economic models of fertility is pioneered in Becker and
Barro (1988) and Barro and Becker (1989). In this section, we show how our
approach to e±cient fertility can be applied to that class of models. In that
approach, at each date, t, the individuals alive make decisions about their
own consumption, how many children to have, and how large a bequest to
leave each child. To make the model more tractable, Barro and Becker assume
that fertility can take on any positive value, not just integers. Because of this,
the analysis of the preceding sections does not directly apply to the Barro-
Becker model. The modi¯cations necessary are straightforward, however.33
We generalize the Barro-Becker framework here by allowing for more than
one period 0 person. Each initial agent i 2 P0 is the dynastic head of his
own dynasty. We allow dynasties to di®er in their initial capital stock, child-
32A formal analysis of this second benchmark case is available upon request.
33Details on this are available online in the technical appendix to this paper (Golosov,
Jones and Tertilt (2006)).
34rearing cost, discount factor, and per capita endowments (e.g. time). We
also use a more general utility function. For most parts in this section, it is
enough to focus on one dynasty. For these cases we drop the superscript i.
In the Barro-Becker model, it is assumed that each agent alive in period
t, it = (it¡1;it), derives utility from his own consumption xt(it) 2 Rk and the









Person it chooses his own consumption, xt(it), his fertility, ft(it) 2 [0; ¹ f] and















Note that ct(ft(it)) is childbirth costs in terms of the k goods and that the
budget constraint includes the bequest that he has received from his own
parents, bt¡1(it;it¡1).
As before, we assume that the technology is characterized by a production
set Y ½ Rk1 and that the equilibrium production plan maximizes pro¯ts.34
Since our goal is to establish that an equilibrium is P- and A-e±cient,
when prices are determined by the interaction of multiple price-taking dy-
nasties, we must ¯rst have a precise de¯nition of what an equilibrium is. To
do this, we will model the formulation above as an in¯nite horizon game in
which in each period each child that is born must make decisions as given
above. How then does a time t decision maker conjecture the future utility
of his children? Of course, the answer is that they must correspond to the
actual utility levels that these children receive if they optimally respond to
the bequests that they receive from their parents, etc. That is, the sequence
of consumption, fertility, bequest plans should be a subgame perfect equilib-
rium (SPE) of this in¯nite horizon game. Of course, there are typically many
34Throughout this section, we assume that Y is a convex cone containing 0 and hence
ignore pro¯ts.
35SPE's of in¯nite horizon games involving di®erent threats of punishments o®
the equilibrium path. There is no easy way to select among these di®erent
equilibria, but one common selection criterion is that it not be too dependent
on the assumption that time lasts forever. That is, it should be the limit of
the equilibria of the ¯nite horizon truncations of the in¯nite horizon game.




t(i;it)git;¿ and a production plan fytg such that:
1. For each dynasty ¿, given fptg, fx¿
t(it);f¿
t (it);b¿
t(i;it)git is the limit of
the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the ¯nite dynasty game (as
described below).35
2. Given fptg, fytg maximizes pro¯ts, i.e. py ¸ p^ y; 8^ y 2 Y
3. The allocation is feasible.
We now describe the details of the ¯nite dynasty game. A T horizon
Barro-Becker game is a game in T+1 stages. The stages will be denoted
by t = 0;1:::;T. In period 0, there is one player, player 0. His actions and
preferences are denoted with 0 subscripts. In period t, t ¸ 1, there are a
continuum of players indexed by it, it 2 Pt = [0; ¹ f]t.
The strategy sets are as follows. In period 0, player 0 must choose
s
0 2 S




where S0 ½ Rk
+ £[0; ¹ f]£Lk
1([0; ¹ f]). Recursively, let ht¡1 denote the history
up to and including period t ¡ 1. In period t, T > t ¸ 1, player it must
choose
35Arguments similar to those in Fudenberg and Levine (1983) can be used to show
that the limit of the SPE outcomes of the ¯nite horizon truncations of this game are,
themselves, SPE outcomes of the in¯nite horizon game. See Golosov, Jones and Tertilt
(2006).




At(ht¡1) if it > fit¡1
f(0;0;0)g if it · fit¡1
where At(ht¡1) = f(xt(it);ft(it);bt(¢;it)) j pt (xt(it) + ct(ft(it)))+
R ¹ f
0 bt(i;it)di ·
ptet(it)+bt¡1(it;it¡1)g. That is, if it is `not born' he has no choices to make.
In the case where it is born, Sit(ht¡1) ½ Rk
+ £ [0; ¹ f] £ Lk
1([0; ¹ f]).
Finally, a player in period T makes similar choices except that he is
constrained to choose fT(iT) = 0, and bT(¢;iT) ´ 0.




























A few technical assumptions are needed for our main result. For this, let F
denote the set of all feasible sequences of total fertility and total consumption
vectors.
Assumption 9 1. Assume ct(f) = fc¤
t for some c¤
t 2 Rk
+.
2. ut(¢) is continuous, strictly increasing, strictly concave and ut(0) = 0.
3. Assume gt(f) = f´ for some ´.
4. Assume that Ht(F;X) ´ gt(F)Fut(X=F) is strictly increasing and
strictly quasi-concave in (F;X).
5. Assume that utility is bounded on the feasible set { for some ¯, ¯ <
^ ¯ < 1, ^ ¯
t
Ht(Ft;Xt) ! 0 for all (Ft;Xt) 2 F
We can now turn to the main result of this section.




fptg be a Barro-Becker equilibrium as de¯ned in De¯nition 6. Then under
Assumptions 9.1-5, z is P-e±cient and A-e±cient.
The proof is given in Appendix A.3. The logic of the proof proceeds in four
steps. First, we show that the equilibrium outcome of each dynastic game
is unique. Second, we show that for each dynasty, the equilibrium outcome
maximizes the utility of the period 0 player if he was choosing the allocation
for the entire dynasty under a common budget constraint. Third, we show
that it is the unique maximizer. This means that any other allocation that is
a®ordable for the dynasty makes the dynastic head strictly worse o®, which
immediately implies that the allocation of the equilibrium outcome is dy-
nastically A- and P-maximizing. The ¯nal step involves recognizing that all
assumptions of Theorem 1 are satis¯ed and hence the equilibrium allocation
is A- and P-e±cient.
5.2 Discussion
Allowing for negative bequests may seem unusual. How crucial is this as-
sumption for the result? Assume for a moment that there was a nonnega-
tivity constraint on bequests, bt(i;it) ¸ 0. Note that if all dynasties were
identical, then this constraint would never be binding in equilibrium; and
hence, the equilibrium allocation would still be P- and A-e±cient. If dynas-
ties are heterogeneous, but not too di®erent, then the same logic will apply
by continuity. However, if the heterogeneity is big, then prohibiting negative
bequests can indeed lead to an ine±ciency in the Barro-Becker environment,
as it e®ectively rules out certain mutually bene¯cial trades between parents
and children.
Finally, note that if the model was extended to longer lifetimes, and
parents and children would overlap for at least one period, then the non-
negativity of bequests could be replaced by the (more plausible) assumption
38that parents have some control over their children's resources.36
6 Applications
In many discussions, it is taken as a given by policy makers that fertility
is `too high' in developing countries and `too low' in some developed coun-
tries.37 Some governments provide free family planning and abortion services
to discourage fertility, while others give large subsidies to encourage fertil-
ity. Few reasons are typically given for this view, although several auxiliary
concerns are mentioned. These include the overall scarcity of factors as well
as the role of population size and density in determining pollution.38 In this
section, we use the tools developed above to identify which of these concerns
do and do not give rise to ine±cient population growth rates. We ¯nd that
scarce factors do not cause fertility to be ine±cient, whereas global external
e®ects do lead to ine±ciencies. As pointed out in Section 3.1, there are typ-
ically never too many people in the P-sense, and this will show up in some
of the examples presented below.
6.1 Land Scarcity
In the policy debate it is often argued that because resources are scarce,
fertility decisions a®ect society as a whole and should therefore not be left
entirely to individuals. The logic provided is that parents do not take into
account that an extra child decreases the amount of these scarce resources
36For notational convenience, we have assumed throughout the paper that people live
for one period only. However, the logic of the proof of Theorem 2 does not depend on this
assumption.
37See for example Financial Times (2004).
38Hardin (1968) argues that the \tragedy of the commons" leads to overpopulation. See
also Becker and Murphy (1988) for a discussion of situations in which equilibria may be
ine±cient.
39per capita. This leads to a discrepancy between private and social costs of
children. Hence, an ine±ciency might arise.39
In this section we argue that this logic is incorrect. The e®ect of reducing
per capita income from adding an additional child (by increasing the aggre-
gate labor supply) is analogous to the e®ect that an individual's increase in
labor supply has on aggregate labor and thereby wages. These e®ects are
channeled through prices and therefore do not lead to an ine±ciency. Thus,
this is an example of a pecuniary externality.
To see this, consider an example in which there are three goods in each
period. The ¯rst is land, the second is time, and the third is a consumption
good. All agents are endowed with one unit of time, which they supply
inelastically to ¯rms if they are born. Those agents alive in period 0, indexed
by i = 1;:::;N, are also endowed with holdings of land, Ai. Let ¹ A =
P
i2P0 Ai
These holdings are sold to the ¯rm and subsequently used forever. The
production function is static: yt = F(A;`f), where F is assumed to be
constant returns to scale in land in labor input.
Pro¯t maximization on the part of the ¯rm then implies that the dy-
nastic P-equilibrium price of land traded in period 0 is given by q0 =
P
t FA( ¹ A;Nt)pt, where Nt is the size of the population in period t and pt
is the equilibrium period 0 price of one unit of the consumption good in
39Many of those involved in the population debate are not economists. Because of this
they do not carefully distinguish between true and pecuniary externalities. As a byproduct
they often go back and forth between arguing that population is 'too high' simply because
of crowding existing resources and because of taxing the ability of the environment to
absorb pollutants. For an example, see the interview with Paul Ehrlich on Uncommon
Knowledge where he states: " ... you're overpopulated when you no longer can live on your
interest, when you've got to live on your capital. And the three main forms of capital that
we're getting rid of very, very rapidly at today's density and today's consumption patterns
are deep rich agricultural soils, biodiversity, which is critical, and maybe the most short-
term critical is our supplies of groundwater everywhere, which are being overdrafted." See
also Ehrlich (2002) and Dasgupta (2001) on crowding and population externalities.
40period t. Similarly, the real wage rate must be wt=pt = F`( ¹ A;Nt).
Thus, in keeping with intuition, if, for whatever reason, ^ Nt > Nt for all
t, and with pt held ¯xed, the sale price of land (and the implicit rental price
as well) is higher while the equilibrium real wage rate must be lower. That
is, because land is scarce, if parents choose to have more children, real wages
must be lower. In this sense, one parent would, across equilibria, lower the
realized wage for all children by increasing his fertility choice. In this sense,
there is crowding of scarce resources.
Despite this fact, it is easy to see that all of the assumptions of Theorem
1 are satis¯ed. It follows that the equilibrium fertility levels chosen will
be P-e±cient (as well as A-e±cient) as long as individual dynastic decision
making is done e±ciently. Note that this result holds independent of the form
of preferences. Thus, although the Barro-Becker formulation is one example
in which this result is true, the conclusion is actually true more generally, as
long as dynasties are maximizing.
6.2 Problems across Dynasties (Pollution)
Our theory also points to situations when equilibria are ine±cient. The
proofs of the ¯rst welfare theorems rely on the assumption that there are no
external e®ects across dynasties. Many policy debates implicitly or explicitly
question the validity of this assumption. In this section we discuss some of
these arguments.
One of the most frequently discussed reasons for a negative e®ect of high
population level is related to pollution and other adverse e®ects each agent
may have on others. It is not clear, though, that such arguments justify poli-
cies that discourage fertility. For example, one might expect that standard
Pigouvian taxes alone could restore optimality. In the Technical Appendix40
we examine this issue in a context of a simpli¯ed two period version of the
40Golosov, Jones, Tertilt (2006)
41Barro-Becker model where external e®ects arise from pollution as a byprod-
uct of period 2 production.
We show that the equilibrium allocation without taxation is ine±cient
in two ways. First, there is `too much' output in period 2 (in both an P-
and an A sense). This is the standard external e®ect. A standard Pigouvian
tax on production leads to a Pareto improvement. It also achieves e±cient
allocations in the P sense. Even with this Pigouvian tax, however, the new
allocations are not A-e±cient. The second ine±ciency arises because the
fertility is \too high". Each parent, by having children, adversely a®ects
other parents through the pollution thereby created. This external e®ect is
not internalized by the Pigouvian tax in the second period. Thus, endogenous
fertility adds an additional dimension to the standard pollution problem {
Parents exacerbate the pollution problem by having too many children, and
a child tax, in addition to the Pigouvian pollution tax, will, in general, be
needed.41 Such a tax is not P-dominating since it decreases the utility of
children who are not being born because of the tax. This example shows that
whether the fertility level is e±cient with the pollution tax only, depends on
the particular notion of e±ciency one uses.
This reasoning needs to be adjusted if the direction of the external a®ects
are reversed { for example, if they arise due to knowledge spillovers. A higher
number of children is bene¯cial for both new and existing people, so that the
equilibrium allocation without child subsidies is not only A- but also P-
ine±cient.
Yet another plausible externality could arise when there is heterogeneity
in the degree of altruism towards one's children and some people derive disu-
tility from seeing other parents neglect their children. It is easy to see that
equilibrium fertility in such a case could be A-ine±ciently high, and that
an A-superior allocation would involve some people compensating others for
41This conclusion, and the example we analyze, is similar to that found in Harford
(1998).
42not having children. Alternatively, such an externality could provide an ef-
¯ciency rationale for existing policies such as mandatory schooling, parental
leave policies etc.
Other examples of the failure of the ¯rst welfare theorem in this environ-
ment arise when key markets are missing. One can imagine many examples
relevant in fertility settings (for example, the lack of insurance against the
risk of not being able to have children). A particularly interesting example
involves private information about expected lifetimes. This is a common ex-
planation given for the relative sparsity of annuity markets. This may lead
parents to have too many children, because parents use children as an alter-
native to annuity contracts. In other words, an A-superior allocation would
involve fewer people with better insurance across dynasties. The missing
markets problem is similar to the pollution externality discussed above. In
both cases, dynasties may well be A-maximizing, and yet, equilibrium fertil-
ity is too high due to a problem in the economy as a whole.
6.3 Problems within a Dynasty (Drugs)
We now give an example of a game among dynasty members that leads to
an equilibrium outcome which is not dynastically P(A)-maximizing. That
is, this is an example showing that in certain contexts the assumption of
dynastic maximization may not be an accurate description of real world
fertility decisions.
There is one initial old person and one potential child, P = f1;(1;1)g.
The parent derives utility from her own consumption and from the con-
sumption of her child: u1 = u(c1) + f1¯u(c(1;1)), where u(¢) is strictly con-
cave. The child has preferences over consumption, c(1;1), and drugs, d(1;1):
u(1;1) = c(1;1) + °d(1;1). People in each period are endowed with one unit
of time. A static technology converts labor into consumption and drugs,
c + d · F(`) = w`. It costs µ units of the consumption good to produce
43a child. Suppose ° > 1, then the optimal strategy for (1;1) is to consume
only drugs, if born. Then the following is a sub-game perfect equilibrium
allocation: z = fc1 = w;f1 = 0;c(1;1) = 0;d(1;1) = 0g. The reason for zero
equilibrium fertility is that knowing that his child will be a drug addict,
the parent prefers not to have a child. But note that, assuming µ is not
too large, z is not P-e±cient, since the following allocation is P-superior:
Z = fc1 = w ¡ µ;f1 = 1;c(1;1) = w;d(1;1) = 0g.42
Note that the above ine±ciency does not disappear with negative be-
quests. Instead, a tax-and-transfer system is required so that the parent can
discourage the use, by the child, of the good the parent does not want the
child to consume. More subtle disagreements between generations can cause
similar problems. A very natural form of dissent would arise if parents and
grandparents di®er in their evaluation of their child/grandchild.43
Note, however, that time inconsistent preferences between parents and
children do not have to lead to an ine±ciency. It is easy to construct an
example where parents and children disagree, but the equilibrium is still ef-
¯cient, as any other allocation would make the child worse o®. This point
is related to an argument made in Section 3.1, where it was shown that
e±ciency need not coincide with utility maximization of the parent. Dis-
agreement between parents and children may simply lead to an equilibrium
allocation that favors the child (since the child chooses second), but this need
not be ine±cient.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented two extensions of the notion of Pareto-
optimality for models in which fertility is endogenous, P-e±ciency and A-
42The alternative allocation is also A-superior.
43An example of this type, but with exogenous fertility, is given in Phelps and Pollak
(1968)
44e±ciency. We have shown that, although models of fertility always have
external e®ects, if these are con¯ned to the family and the family makes
optimal decisions, the time series of populations that is generated is optimal.
One interesting implication of this result is that the Samuelson ine±ciency
that can be found in standard OLG economies disappears in this context. We
have shown that the most popular economic model of fertility choice, that of
Barro and Becker (1989), satis¯es the assumption of dynastic optimization,
and hence, in that model, population is e±cient. Finally, we have shown that
the presence of external e®ects can cause individually optimal fertility choices
to be suboptimal from a social point of view and that this bias depends on
the direction of the external e®ect.
Our analysis suggests the following typology for ine±ciencies when fertil-
ity is endogenous.
1. The assumptions of the ¯rst welfare theorem might not be satis¯ed
for standard reasons based on interactions among individuals. Exam-
ples include external e®ects, public goods, congestion e®ects, missing
markets, and private information.
2. Limitations on bequests, lack of perfect altruism, and so on, cause the
family allocation to not be P-maximizing (or A-maximizing).
There are several issues that have not been addressed in the current pa-
per, but seem interesting for future research. One is to extend the concepts
to allow for uncertainty and then analyze interactions between fertility and
missing markets (such as annuity markets) in a more serious way. Secondly,
this paper assumes unisexual reproduction, whereas one would like to be able
to address questions of marriage. If marriage was endogenous, then dynas-
ties could intermingle and potentially the whole world would be one dynasty.
Finally, we think that an analysis of existing fertility policies would be very
interesting. The results in this paper could be interpreted as saying that
failures of intra-family coordination are more important than inter-family
45problems. If this was true, then one might want to correct any popula-
tion problem by broadening the contract space between family members (i.e.
richer inheritance law etc.) instead of giving out free contraception etc.
Only by pursuing this line of research can positive progress can be made
into the important policy debates on population that are now being waged.
As an example, some researchers argue that fertility is `too low' in many
European countries. The arguments typically given are along the line that
the social bene¯t of having children exceeds the private one, because, without
children, labor supply will be `too small' in the future. This does not point
to any particular reason for the theorems we have presented to not hold {
no global external e®ects, or particular di±culties for families to be making
e±cient decisions are mentioned, etc., { and thus, it is reminiscent of the
scarce factor example discussed above.44 In environments without problems
like these, the resulting allocation would be both P and A¡e±cient and so no
interventions are called for45. Even with problems like these, the appropriate
intervention depends on the exact nature of the imperfection. Thus, while it
is possible that the conclusion is correct { perhaps because of the di±culty in
leaving negative bequests { we believe that it is critical to precisely identify
the source of the ine±ciency before a serious policy debate can be held.
44It also ignores that there are many places in the world where fertility is quite high,
so that there seems to be little danger of labor supply being `low' any time in the near
future.
45Of course, another rationale for intervention is that it allows governments to choose a
di®erent e±cient allocation from the one that arises in equilibrium.
46A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3
This proof uses the First Welfare Theorem (Theorem 1) in its construction.
See Section A.2 for a proof of that result.
For any given population, I, let C(I) be the total cost of child rearing with
that population. Let Y (I) be the total resources available for consumption





Let Y j(I) be the total resources available for consumption if we consider
only the endowments of a dynansty j in the population I, that is, Y j(I) =
P
i2Dj\I e(i) ¡ Cj(Dj \ I), where Cj(Dj \ I) is the total cost of rearing the
children born to dynasty j if I is the population. Since child rearing costs
are assumed additive across dynasties, Y (I) =
P
j Y j(I):
Consider any A-e±cient allocation (f¤;x¤): Let (f¤
j ;x¤
j) be the allocations
in (f¤;x¤) that agents in dynasty j receive. By Assumption 6, there are no
external e®ects across dynasties, and hence, for some wealth redistribution




j = 0, the (f¤
j ;x¤
























j). We also let u¤
i = ¹ ui for all i 2 PnI(f¤): We denote the vec-
tor of utilities arising in this way by V (I(f¤);T ¤;u¤) = (V j(I(f¤);T ¤;u¤))j2P0.
47Denote by ®¤
j = (®¤
i)i2I(z¤)\Djnfjg the vector of multipliers on the util-
ity constraints on the problem (i.e., ®¤
i is the multiplier on the constraint
ui(f;x) ¸ u¤
i), and note that the this problem can be rewritten as maximiz-
ing a weighted sum of utilities of those dynasty members in I(f¤) \ Dj with
weights given by ®¤
i for the members in I(f¤) \ Djnfjg and 1 for j himself.
Lemma 1 Consider any (f¤;x¤) which is in AnP. Then there exists another
population I; I(f¤) ½ I and an allocation ( ~ f; ~ x) that solves
maxuj(f;x)
s.t.








Moreover, the solution to this problem is such that V j(I(f¤);T ¤;u¤) = V j(I;T ¤;u¤)
for all j:
Proof. Follows from Proposition 2 and discussion above.
Pick any (f¤;x¤) 2 AnP and corresponding ®¤,T ¤: Let I¤ = I(z¤) be the
population in that allocation. Let ( ^ f; ^ x) be any allocation that P-dominates
(f¤;x¤) such that condition a of Proposition 3 is satis¯ed. We know that









for all j 2 P0.
Note that any allocation ( ^ f; ^ x) with a population larger than I¤ must
have less total resources available for consumption, Y (I( ^ f)) < Y (I(f¤)).
Otherwise, all agents in I(f¤) could receive exactly the same consumption
as under (f¤;x¤); and this new allocaiton would clearly A-dominate (f¤;z¤).
This implies that there must be some agent with a positive ®¤ weight such
48that x¤(i) > ^ x(i): Using our assumption about utility functions, Assumption
6, this implies that the consumption of all agents with positive ®¤
i in the
dynasty also falls. To see this, consider any agent with positive ®¤
i weight.
By Proposition 2, utilities of all other agents in the dynamisty either remain
constant or increases. For his utility level to remain unchanged it must
therefore be true that his consumption decreased.
Using the form of the utility function and the assumption that x¤(i) > 0




























since ui0i is strictly concave and x¤(i) > ^ x(i).
Now we are ready to prove the main result:
Proof of Proposition 3: Assume that dynasty j¤ has new people under
the allocation ( ^ f; ^ x), i.e. I( ^ f)nI(f¤) \ Dj¤ 6= ;. Assume that (f¤
j ;x¤
j) is
supported by the transfers T ¤
j and that the allocation maximizes the social
welfare function with weights ®¤. Take a sequence of Tn converging to T ¤ with
the restriction that Tj¤n < T ¤
j¤ for all dynasties with more people under ( ^ f; ^ x)
and
P
j Tjn = 0. Consider all the possible population sizes I with I¤ ½ I:
Since (f¤;x¤) is A-e±cient, it must be true that V (I¤;T ¤;u¤) ¸ V (I;T ¤;u¤)
(here V j is assumed to take the value ¡1 if the constraint set is empty in
the maximization problem). Since (f¤;x¤) 2 AnP this inequality must hold
with equality for some I. Note that V is continuous in T at (I¤;T ¤;u¤) as
long as
P
i2Dj x¤(i) > 0 for all j 2 P0, which is true by assumption. This im-
plies that if V j(I¤;T ¤;u¤) > V j(I;T ¤;u¤) for some j;I then V f(I¤;Tn;u¤) >
V j(I;Tn;u¤) for all Tn close enough to T ¤: Therefore the allocations that solve
V j(I;Tn;u¤) are A-dominated by those solving V j(I¤;Tn;u¤): Consider any I
such that V j¤(I¤;T;u¤) = V j¤(I;T;u¤). By construction Tj¤n < T ¤
j¤. Thus, in
a neighborhood of T ¤, using (4), we have, V j¤(I¤;Tn;u¤) > V j¤(I;Tn;u¤) for
all such j¤. Similarly, for all j such that V j(I¤;T ¤;u¤) > V j(I;T ¤;u¤) it still
49true that V j(I¤;Tn;u¤) > V j(I;Tn;u¤). It follows that the (fj(Tn);xj(Tn)),
where (f(Tn);x(Tn)) = (fj(Tn);xj(Tn))j2P0, are dynastically P-maximizing
for each dynasty given the resources Y j(I(z¤)) + Tjn. Thus, by the First
Welfare Theorem, the (f(Tn);x(Tn)), are a sequence of P-e±cient alloca-
tions that have a population size I¤: Since (f(Tn);x(Tn)) ! (f(T ¤);x(T ¤))
this completes the proof.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
We provide the proof for A-e±ciency, the P-e±ciency proof is similar. It is
useful to ¯rst prove the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Assume i 2 P0 has strictly monotone preferences in x(i). Let
(f¤(i);x¤(i)) be dynastically A-maximizing for dynasty Di, given prices p and









The proof of the lemma is very standard and hence omitted. One thing
that is di®erent from the usual proof is that with A-maximization, the set
of people that is eligible to count in an improving allocation depends on the
original allocation. However, our assumption that the set of people at time
0 is ¯xed guarantees that this does not cause any problems.
We now proceed to prove Theorem 1. First, note that since ui(f(i);x(i);f(¡i);x(¡i))
is strictly monotone in x(i) for all i 2 P0, for the given allocation to be a dy-





j2Pt\I(fi) pte(j) < 1, for all i.




j2Pt\I(f) ej + y¤
t < 1.
Now, (p¤;f¤;x¤;y¤) is a dynastic A-equilibrium and by way of contra-
diction, assume that it is not A-e±cient. Then an alternative feasible allo-
cation ( ^ f; ^ x; ^ y), exists that is A-superior to (f¤;x¤;y¤). That is, uj( ^ f; ^ x) ¸
uj(f¤;x¤) for all j 2 I(f¤)
T
I( ^ f) and uj¤( ^ f; ^ x) > uj¤(f¤;x¤) for at least
50one j¤ 2 I(f¤)
T
I( ^ f). Assume j¤ 2 Di¤. Then, since (f¤
i¤;x¤
i¤) is dynasti-
cally A-maximizing, and since there are no external e®ects across dynasties

























































Note that the right hand side is ¯nite; hence, the strict inequality is preserved.
Pro¯t maximization implies that p¤y¤ ¸ p¤y for all other production plans

















Finally, feasibility of ( ^ f; ^ x; ^ y) implies that
X
j2Pt\I( ^ f)
(^ x(j) + c( ^ f(j))) · ^ yt +
X
j2Pt\I( ^ f)
e(j) for all t
Multiplying the above by p¤

















But this contradicts equation (6) which completes the proof. ¤
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
As a ¯rst step in the proof of the theorem, we characterize the subgame
perfect equilibrium outcomes of the ¯nite horizon truncations of the game
51played inside a dynasty for a ¯xed set of prices. For this, let ¡(a;q;T) denote
the game with T + 1 periods, and initial dynasty wealth a when the prices
are q = (q0;:::;qT). Then, we have:
Lemma 3 1. For every (a;q;T), ¡(a;q;T) has a unique subgame per-
fect equilibrium in pure strategies, and hence a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium outcome.
2. For every (a;q;T), the SPE outcome is symmetric, (xs(i);fs(i);bs(i;j)) =
(xs(i0);fs(i0);bs(i0;j0)); for all 0 · s · T for all 0 · i;i0 · fs¡1, and
for all 0 · j;j0 · fs.
3. For every (a;q;T), for every 0 · s · T, and every history up to s, the
outcome of the continuation subgame is unique, symmetric, depends
only on the bequest given to each agent, bs¡1(is;is¡1), and solves:
max
xs;fs;xs+1;fs+1;:::;xT
Us = u(xs) + ¯g(fs)fsu(xs+1) + ¯
2g(fs)fsg(fs+1)fs+1u(xs+2) + :::
s:t: qs [xs + c(fs)] + qs+1fs [xs+1 + c(fs+1)] + ::: + qT (fT¡1fT¡2:::fs)xT
· qses + qs+1fses+1 + ::: + qT (fT¡1fT¡2:::fs)eT + bs¡1(is;i
s¡1)
4. For every (a;q;T), for every 0 · s · T, and every history up to s,
the utility, at the SPE equilibrium outcome of the continuation game,
realized by the time s player, Us(bs¡1(is;is¡1)), is strictly concave in
bs¡1(is;is¡1).
Note: in 3 and 4, we have adopted the notation that bs¡1 = a.
Proof: The proof of the lemma proceeds by induction on T, beginning
with T = 0, that is, a 1 period game. For the T = 0 case, the proofs of
1-4 are straightforward, with 4, that U0(a) is concave in a, being a standard
result from consumer theory since u is strictly concave.
52Given that 1-4 hold for T, we must show that they hold for T + 1.
That 4 holds follows immediately from the induction hypothesis for any
0 · s · T. It follows that given any choice of strategies by the time 0
player, (x0;f0;b0(i)), the equilibrium outcome of the resulting continuation
game is unique and the utility received by player i in period 1 is given by
U1(b0(i)).46 Thus, the time zero player must solve:
max
x0;f0;b0(i)




s:t: q0 [x0 + c(f0)] +
Z f0
0
b0(i)di · q0e0 + a
First, we show that the solution to this problem has b0(i) = b0 8i for some b0.
To see this, suppose that x¤
0;f¤
0; and b¤
0(i), is the optimal choice for the period
0 player, and assume to the contrary that b¤
0(i) is not constant. Note that an
alternative strategy that is feasible is (x¤
0;f¤







This alternative strategy ¯xes (x0;f0) = (x¤
0;f¤
0) but makes bequests equal




















the payo® of the supposed optimal strategy. The inequality is strict because
U1(b0(i)) is a strictly concave function of b0(i) and b¤
0 is assumed non-constant.
This establishes that the SPE has the property that b0(i) is a constant. This
together with 2 from the induction hypothesis for T period games shows that
2 holds for all 0 · s · T + 1 in T + 1 period games.
Given this, it follows that the period-0 agent must solve:
max
x0;f0;b0
U0 = u(x0) + ¯g(f0)U1(b0)
s:t: q0 [x0 + c(f0)] + f0b0 · q0e0 + a
By the time consistency of preferences, U0(x0;f0;x1;f1;:::;xT+1)
= u(x0) + ¯g(f0)f0U1(x1;f1;x2;f2;:::;xT+1), and given that U1(b0) solves
46We simplify the notation for the time 0 allocation, because there is only one time 0
player, and hence the allocation does not need to be indexed by i0.
53(from 3 of the induction hypothesis):
max
x1;f1;x2;f2;:::;xT+1
U1 = u(x1) + ¯g(f1)f1u(x2) + ¯
2g(f1)f1g(f2)f2u(x3) + :::
s:t: q1 [x1 + c(f1)] + q2f1 [x2 + c(f2)] + ::: + qT+1 (fTfT¡1:::f1)xT+1
· q1e1 + q2f2e2::: + qT+1 (fTfT¡1:::f1)eT+1 + b0;
a standard two-step budget approach shows that the solution to the problem
of the time zero agent is the same as that from solving:
max
x0;f0;x1;f1;:::;xT+1
U0 = u(x0) + ¯g(f0)f0u(x1) + ¯
2g(f0)f0g(f1)f1u(x2) + :::
s:t: q0 [x0 + c(f0)] + q1f0 [x1 + c(f1)] + ::: + qT+1 (fTfT¡1:::f0)xT+1
· q0e0 + q1f0e1::: + qT+1 (fTfT¡1:::f0)eT+1 + a
Following Alvarez (1999), it is more convenient to write this problem in
aggregate form by making the substitutions that F0 = 1, Ft = ft¡1Ft¡1, and
Xt = Ftxt. In this notation, the equilibrium outcome of the game solves the
following concave optimization problem, which we call (PAggT).
max
X0;F1;X1:::




s:t: q0 [X0 + c(F1) ¡ e1] + q1 [X1 + c(F2) ¡ F1e1] + ::: + qT+1 [XT+1 ¡ FT+1eT+1] · a
By Assumptions 9.2 and 9.4, this problem has a unique solution and the
utility realized, U0(a) is strictly concave in a. Thus, this establishes 3 and 4
for s = 0 in a T + 1 period game. Coupled with 3 and 4 from the induction
hypothesis, it follows that 3 and 4 hold for all 0 · s · T + 1 in any T + 1
period game.
The fact that the solution to this problem is unique for s = 0 in a T + 1
period game implies that the SPE of the T + 1 period game is unique and
that the outcome is unique, establishing the validity of part 1 for T +1. This
completes the proof of the Lemma. ¤
The next step in the proof of the Theorem is to show that the solution to
the time 0 planner's problem is also symmetric and, because of this, solves,
in aggregates, the same concave maximization problem as the SPE outcome.
54Lemma 4 For each (a;q;T), the solution to the dynasty planners problem
at time 0 is symmetric (xt(i) = xt(i0), ft(i) = ft(i0) for all i;i0;t, and, in
aggregates, solves (PAggT).















































· a + q0e0 + q1e1
Z f0
0








The proof that the functions xt and ft are optimally chosen to be constants
are tedious but straightforward, mimicking the arguments given in Lemma 3
above. For example, the analysis of the third term in the objective function






Denote quantities at the optimum with stars, i.e., x¤
2(i1;i2), etc. To see that
x¤
2(i1;i2) is (a.e.) chosen to be a constant independent of i2, suppose that this
is not the case and consider the alternative plan in which all other variables
are left unchanged but:




























55and this inequality is strict unless x¤
2(i1;i2) = ¹ x2(i1)(a:e:). Since x¤
2(i1;i2) =
¹ x2(i1) also satis¯es the budget constraint (leaving everything else unchanged),
it follows that we can assume that x¤
2(i1;i2) = x¤
2(i1) without loss of general-
ity.















To see that f¤
1 and x¤
2 are constants, if this is not true, consider the alternative
plan, ^ f1 and ^ x2 given by:

















































Again, this equality is strict unless (f¤
1(i1);x¤
2(i1)) = ( ¹ f1; ¹ x2)(a:e:). This pro-
posed change satis¯es the budget constraint by construction (this uses the
form of c). However, unlike in the step above, f1 also enters the objective
function (and the budget constraint) in other terms as well. Thus, to com-
plete the proof, it is necessary to show that none of the other terms in the
objective function are lessened by this change. Since this argument mirrors
those given here step by step, this is not included. This shows that the solu-
tion to the time 0 planning problem problem is also given by the solution to
(PAggT) and completes the proof of Lemma 4. ¤
Proof of Theorem 2:
Consider a Barro and Becker equilibrium. To show that the equilibrium
allocation is P- (respectively A-) e±cient, it is, by Theorem 1, su±cient
56to show that the equilibrium allocation is dynastically P- (respectively A-)
maximizing at the given prices. This follows immediately once it is noted
that the equilibrium allocation is the unique solution to the problem of the
dynasty head, faced by the in¯nite horizon dynastic budget constraint. Any
other allocation will make the dynastic head strictly worse o® and hence,
cannot be superior.
>From the de¯nition of equilibrium, an allocation that is part of a Barro
and Becker equilibrium is, by assumption, the limit of a sequence of SPE
equilibrium outcomes for the ¯nite horizon truncations of the game (given
prices). From the Lemmas, applied with q = (p0;p1;::::;pT) for each T, it
follows that, for every T, this allocation is both unique, and solves the ¯nite
horizon truncated version of the dynasty heads maximization problem. By
the de¯nition of the Barro-Becker equilibrium allocation, it is the limit of
the solutions to these ¯nite horizon problems. The proof that this limiting
allocation solves the limiting maximization problem is straightforward given
assumption 6.5 and is omitted. ¤
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2 Period Example with f=3 
 
P = {1,2,(1,1),(1,2),(1,3),(2,1),(2,2),(2,3)} 
I(f)={1, 2, (1,1), (2,1), (2,2)} 
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P0={1,2} = I0(f) 
I1(f)={(1,1),(2,1),(2,2)} ⊂ P1 ={(1,1),(1,2),(1,3),(2,1),(2,2),(2,3)} 
 













Set of P-efficient 
Fertility levels
Given α, S(α) is unique.  Fertility decreases in α
u(e1)